| Country: | Sudan |
| Details of Formation: | The Rapid Support Force was created in mid-2013 (Human Rights Watch 2015) and rose to prominence in late 2013. One news source mentions that the RSF were formed in response to Sudanese Revolutionary Front attacks against infrastructure projects in several towns. The idea for its creation emerged in the Sudanese parliament. The RSF drew heavily on the remnants of the Janjaweed militia. |
| Details of Termination: | The Rapid Support Forces are still an active PGM as of 2017 (Human Rights Watch 2017). |
| Purpose: | The main purpose of the RSF is to fight against rebel groups in Darfur and throughout Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2015). News sources mention that the RSF was deployed to protect the capital, or to act as personal force for President Bashir to protect his rule in the context of decreased loyalty in the official army. One news source mentions that it was used to prevent civil unrest and quell protests in Khartoum in September 2013 and that this was their real purpose. However, other news sources do not mention further instances of such use, indicating that this was, if at all, only a minor purpose compared to their counterinsurgency use. In December 2014, President Bashir lauded the RSF for their effectiveness in the fight against rebels. |
| Organisation: | The RSF acts under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) (Human Rights Watch 2015), to which they are affiliated administratively, financially, and in the areas of training, weaponry and field operations, as reported by a news source. On the ground the RSF is commanded by Brig. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo, commonly known as “Hemeti (alternative spelling in news sources: Hamaydti). Hemeti is a former Border Guard commander and Janjaweed militia leader; he reports to NISS Maj. Gen. Abbas Abdul-Aziz. NISS Director General Al al-Nasih-Al-Galla has the overall command over the RSF. The RSF is also in contact with NISS Director General Al al-Nasih-Al-Galla. Members are issued NISS ID carts and enjoy NISS immunity. Since January 2014, the RSF is given regular force status by a constitutional amendment (Human Rights Watch 2015). They conduct joint operations with the army for which they act as support forces (Amnesty International 2014b). News sources emphasize the strict command structure of the RSF and mention that they are led by army officers and Janjaweed leaders. |
| Weapons and Training: | The RSF receives training from the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). Members of the RSF usually receive around four months of training before being deployed to the battlefields. The RSF are reported to carry light arms. |
| Size: | In February 2014, the RSF was reported to have around 5,000 to 6,000 troops. This number has increased since. (Human Rights Watch 2015). A news source from July 2014 gives evidence for at least 3,000 RSF fighters, with an estimated total of 10,000. |
| Reason for Membership: | -- |
| Treatment of Civilians: | The RSF committed large-scale abuses against civilians. During their counterinsurgency campaigns in Darfur, the RSF regularly attacked villages, looted civilians’ properties, destroyed infrastructure necessary for surviving in the desert (e.g. wells), forcibly displaced, beat, tortured, executed and raped civilians. Especially rape was widespread, with the RSF committing repeated gang rapes of women, and girls, but also of men, though the latter were affected in a smaller scale. The RSF abuses were systematic and are considered to amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. They often acted together with the Sudanese army. RSF members were ordered by their commanders to commit the crimes: Commander Hemeti ordered to abuse women and Sudanese Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman directly addressed the army and the RSF and told them to kill any men they encountered (Human Rights Watch 2015). President Bashir publicly defended the RSF (Human Rights Watch 2014). After Sadiq Al Mahdi, leader of the National Umma Party, and Ibrahim al-Sheikh, head of the opposition Sudanese Congress Party, accused the RSF of committing abuses against civilians, they were arrested (Amnesty International 2014a). |
| Other Information: | The Rapid Support Force (RSF) is also known as al-Quwat al-Da’m al-Sari’ in Arabic. Members come from other paramilitary forces, such as the Border Guards or the Janjaweed. The majority of members are Darfurians recruited by Hemeti, the RSF’s commander. Many come from Hemeti’s own clan or other clans within the abbala Riziegat; some are ethnic Nuba (Human Rights Watch 2015). According to one news source, members are highly trained and disciplined military men; another news source describes members as unemployed youths from Arab tribes. The RSF cooperates with the Sudanese army, but in some occasions also fought against them. Upon foundation, the RSF was deployed to South Kordofan. In February 2014, it began to be active in Darfur, especially in South and East Darfur (Human Rights Watch 2015). The RSF was designed to be a new version of the Janjaweed; as of 2014, it is not clear, whether the Janjaweed became absorbed in the RSF or maintained a certain independence. Some sources mention the terms RSF and Janjaweed interchangeably or as synonyms, while others refer to actions conducted by the RSF together with the Janjaweed, i.e. distinguishing between both groups (cf. Human Rights Watch 2015). A possible reason for the ambiguous sources is the increased use of the term Janjaweed as a catch-all phrase for tribal PGMs. |
| References: |
Amnesty International. 2014a. “Sudan: End arbitrary detention of activists and investigate torture allegations.” June 25. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/06/sudan-end-arbitrary-detention-activists-and-investigate-torture-allegations/ Amnesty International. 2014b. “Sudan: Satellite images of indiscriminate bombing reveal potential war crime in Southern Kordofan.” June 25. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/06/sudan-satellite-images-indiscriminate-bombing-reveal-potential-war-crime-southern-kordofan/ Human Rights Watch. 2014. “Darfur: UN Should End Silence on Rights Abuses.” August 21. https://www.hrw.org/print/254942 Human Rights Watch. 2015. “‘Men with No Mercy’. Rapid Support Forces Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan.” September. ISBN: 978-1-623-132651 Human Rights Watch. 2017. “Human Rights Benchmarks for Sudan. Eight Ways to Measure Progress.” May 3. https://www.hrw.org/print/303166 Information was taken from news sources listed in the PGMD |