| Country: | Sudan |
| Details of Formation: | The Janjaweed existed since the 1980s, when they were an armed group of nomadic Arab tribes fighting over land and water with African farmers. News sources mention that the government already used Arab militias against dissidents in the 1980s and early 1990s, but they do not explicitly mention the Janjaweed, although they might imply them. The first clear evidence of Janjaweed being pro-government goes back to the 1996-1998 war between Masalit and Arabs. Back then the Janjaweed are mentioned to be organized by the government and to collaborate with the army (UCDP). A news source calls the Janjaweed a government-backed militia in 2000 and 2001. The Janjaweed became important after 2003 when the government started using them in large-scale anti-insurgency operations (Human Rights Watch 2004a). |
| Details of Termination: | In 2004, the UN Security Council demanded in Resolution 1556 the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias. The Sudanese government subsequently pledged to disarm the Janjaweed, but did not comply with the resolution, as no real disarmament followed (Human Rights Watch 2004b). Instead, it absorbed some of the Janjaweed members into the police and different paramilitary forces in Darfur (Human Rights Watch 2004a). In 2007, some Janjaweed leaders reportedly joined rebel groups because they did not receive the land, cattle and money which the Sudanese government had promised. News sources continue to refer to the Janjaweed as pro-government. In 2014, President al-Bashir reconstituted the Janjaweed as Rapid Support Forces (UCDP). The RSF is coded as separate PGM in the PGMD. As of 2014, it is not clear whether the Janjaweed subsequently dissolved into the RSF or whether they continued to operate independently, albeit under the umbrella of the RSF structure. |
| Purpose: | Officially, the Sudanese government told the Janjaweed that their purpose was to defend themselves from the insurgents. The main purpose of the Janjaweed was to support the Sudanese government’s counterinsurgency campaign in the Darfur region (Human Rights Watch 2004a). As they are mainly used to commit atrocities against civilians who belong to the same ethnic group as the insurgents, it has been suggested that the real purpose of the Janjaweed was to terrorize civilians (Amnesty International 2006c), allowing the government to deny its involvement in such violence (Amnesty International 2006a). The Janjaweed also had better knowledge of desert warfare than the regular army (UCDP) and the Sudanese government has used them as proxy-force on the ground. In 2014, President Bashir used the Janjaweed to counter the decreasing loyalty of the Sudanese Armed Forces. |
| Organisation: | The Janjaweed closely cooperate with the Sudanese army, and enjoy air support through aerial bombardment and helicopter reconnaissance before and after their operations. News sources say that Janjaweed members in the field are led by top army commanders who in turn receive orders from the Western command center and from Khartoum. They have connections to high levels of the civilian administration which organized the Janjaweed’s recruitment, support and impunity. Several directives concerning the Janjaweed were issued by the governor of South Darfur. The governor also formed a security committee to increase levels of recruitment; the committee includes leaders of tribes contributing to the Janjaweed (Human Rights Watch 2004a). In December 2003 Sudanese President Bashar mentioned using the Janjaweed in a speech. The Janjaweed’s main leader, Musa Hilal, also has a direct relationship to the government (Amnesty International 2006a). Musa Hilal is leader of the Jalul tribe in North Darfur and leader of a supremacist organization called the Tajamu al Arab (translations differ: Arab Gathering, Arab Alliance, Arab Congregation, or Arab Congress). Tajamu al Arab allegedly has contact to intelligence services of some Arab countries (UCDP). News sources report that the Janjaweed fighters are organized into battalions with the same structure as the regular army. In 2004, many Janjaweed were incorporated into the army and the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), which is coded as separate PGM. Still, the Janjaweed are continued to be referred to as an independent group; one news source says they were PDF by day and Janjaweed by night. Their inclusion into the PDF aimed at making the Janjaweed disappear from the public eye while allowing them to remain active. |
| Weapons and Training: | Janjaweed receive weapons from the government, including Kalashnikovs, G3 guns Sudanese-made weapons (Amnesty International 2006a, 2006c). In 2004, government helicopters brought weapons and ammunitions, as well as other provisions to the main camp in Mistriya three times a week (Human Rights Watch 2004a). According to a news source from 2007, the African Union commander in Nyala, in South Darfur said that the Sudanese government was no longer arming the Janjaweed. Another news source dated 2004, citing Jaffer Monro, a MP for the ruling National Congress, says the Janjaweed receive proper military training from the government. |
| Size: | A news source from April 2004 says that the government recruited and armed more than 20,000 Janjaweed. Another news source, from March 2005, reports the government asking Musa Hilal to mobilise 300,000 tribesmen as Janjaweed. |
| Reason for Membership: | News sources suggests that most Janjaweed members are motivated by material rewards they receive from the government for participation. Those who are not eligible for monthly salaries (for example Janjaweed who are not formally part of the Border Intelligence Guard or the Popular Defense Force) are still rewarded with new weapons and impunity for looting, killing and raping in the context of the military operations (Amnesty International 2006a). Additionally, many nomadic Arab Janjaweed have an intrinsic interest in participating the Darfur conflict, as they had been involved in clashes with African farmers in previous years. Through the Janjaweed, they can obtain land and livestock for their herds (Human Rights Watch 2004a). |
| Treatment of Civilians: | The Janjaweed committed numerous human rights abuses against civilians, to a degree that the United Nations termed is ethnic cleansing. In joint actions with the Sudanese army, the Janjaweed committed extrajudicial executions (Amnesty International 2006a). The Janjaweed displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians from their homes, as well as looted and appropriated their land. The displaced were kept in IDP camps, which the Janjaweed guarded. Any men who fled faced beatings, torture and death, while women leaving the camp to collect wood were sometimes enslaved to serve in a Janjaweed members’ household and/or were raped. Men were also subjected to sexual violence. The police did not pursue the Janjaweed for these actions, stating that they were powerless compared to the Janjaweed; sometimes, the police were complicit in the crimes. Janjaweed also committed atrocities against civilians in Eastern Chad (Amnesty International 2006b). The war crimes committed against civilians by the Janjaweed were authorized at the highest level of the state bureaucracy. The official role of the Janjaweed around the IDP camps was to protect civilians (Human Rights Watch 2004a). News sources report that the Janjaweed primarily targeted members of the Four, Zaghawa and Massaleet ethnic groups and that the actions taken against the civilians were part of the government’s scorched earth campaign, explaining the full impunity the Janjaweed enjoyed. In 2009, the International Criminal Court charged Ali Kushayb, an alleged Janjaweed leader for war crimes, but the Sudanese government refused to cooperate with the ICC (Amnesty International 2013). The Janjaweed’s presence and actions contributed to an escalation of violence: In response to the attacks by the Janjaweed against civilians and the failed government protection, the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement began attacking Sudanese government in 2003. As a consequence, the Sudanese government initiated the Janjaweed-backed scorched earth campaign (Amnesty International 2006b). |
| Other Information: | Janjaweed literally means “ghosts/devils on horseback”; alternative transcriptions include Gangawied, Jingaweit and Janjawid. As the name is perceived as an insult, Janjaweed members prefer to call themselves Border Intelligence Guard, Second Reconnaissance Brigade, “the Quick and the Horrible”, Peshmerga (Western Darfur), Fursan (horsemen) or mujahedeen. As recognized by the UN International Commission of Inquiry, “Janjaweed” is a catch-all term for pro-government Arab militias that enjoy impunity for their actions (Amnesty International 2006a). Janjaweed are mostly nomad Arab camel-herding tribes from North Darfur who had originally come to the region in the 1970s from Chad and Western Africa (Human Rights Watch 2004a). Over time, smaller, often African, tribes that were disadvantaged by the traditional administrative system joined the Janjaweed (Amnesty International 2006b). The Janjaweed also operate in eastern Chad. In 2007, there was heavy fighting among Arab tribes which are part of the Janjaweed. There is one report which states that the Jangaweed are also active in Upper Nile State. However, there is no additional information about events in Upper Nile. There is one report which states that the Jangaweed are also active in Upper Nile State. There is no additional information about events in Upper Nile. |
| References: |
Amnesty International. 2006a. “Beyond any doubt: Sudan uses and supports the Janjawid in Darfur.” AI Index: IOR 41/028/2006. December 8. Amnesty International. 2006b. “Sudan: Crying out for safety.” AI Index: AFR 54/055/2006. October. Amnesty International. 2006c. “Sudan Government’s solution: Janjawid unleashed in Darfur.” AI Index: AFR 54/078/2006. November 24. Amnesty International. 2013. “UN: Demand al-Bashir’s surrender to the International Criminal Court.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/09/un-demand-al-bashir-s-surrender-international-criminal-court/ Human Rights Watch. 2004a. “Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support.” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper. July 19. Human Rights Watch. 2004b. “Sudan: U.N. Must Extend Arms Embargo.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/09/12/sudan-un-must-extend-arms-embargo Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2019. “Janjaweed.” https://www.ucdp.uu.se/actor/630 Information was taken from news sources listed in the PGMD |